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sort  familiar  from  the  writings  of  Putnam  and  Burge?  Account  for  our  ability  to 
rationally police our own attitudes? Prove that virtually everything Descartes wrote 




The  only  answer  that would  prompt  anything  like widespread  assent  is  probably 
‘some of the above’,  the usual rules of the game being that, whatever  it  is that one 
does,  one  needs  to  do  it  while  avoiding  the  aspects  of  the  Cartesian  picture  that 
prompt  worries  about  our  knowledge  of  other minds,  private  languages,  and  the 
like.  The  thirteen  papers  in  this  volume  (written  by  thirteen  distinguished 
philosophers,  whose  primary  interests  are  spread  across  epistemology  and  the 
philosophies of mind and language) attempt to do, well, some of the above. Here I’ll 
pick my way through some of the contributions, focusing on those about which I’ve 






In  the  opening  paper,  Ram Neta  poses  and  attempts  to  answer  an  important  and 
rather  neglected  question.  It’s  widely  assumed  that  we  enjoy  PA  to  our  beliefs, 












that q  just when one has  the ability  to believe  that q when and because of q  (29). 
While we have this ability with respect to the relevant facts about our beliefs, hopes, 
and  sensations, we  lack  it with  respect  to  facts  about  our  knowings,  seeings,  and 
rememberings. That’s why PA gives out where it does. 
 
I  have  several  misgivings  with  this  proposal.  First,  the  truth‐sufficiency  account 
seems under‐motivated and problematic. By way of motivation, Neta suggests (21) 
that  it  explains  the  phenomenon  of  immunity  to  error  through  misidentification 
(henceforth  IEM)  and  related phenomena. But  this  is  implausible,  even before we 
see the details. As Evans and subsequent commentators have stressed, the class of 
judgments  that  display  IEM  outstrips  the  class  of  judgments  that  exploit  PA  (an 
example is offered below), and so the proposed explanation is at best incomplete. As 
for  the  truth‐sufficiency  account  itself,  it  only  offers  an  account  of  PA  to 
propositional attitudes if such attitudes can be presented to consciousness in such a 
way as to provide a reason or justification for the belief that one has those attitudes. 
We have,  at  present  at  least,  no  promising model  of  how  this might work  (Coliva 
2008).  Finally,  those  (myself  included)  who  take  the  apparent  groundlessness  or 
baselessness of basic self‐knowledge more seriously than Neta does (22) will regard 





his proposal. He’s well  aware of  this,  and  seems  inclined not  to worry,  suggesting 
that we should be open to the possibility that  further  investigation may reveal the 
reach of PA to be rather more limited or more extensive than we typically assume 
(30‐1). But  if we already have  reservations  about Neta’s proposal,  this  is  liable  to 
seem unsatisfying.  
 
Still,  while  I’m  sceptical  of  Neta’s  own  response,  he  raises  a  significant  challenge. 







of  seeing,  in  order  to  yield  armchair  knowledge  of  contingent  facts  about  the 
external world. The matter deserves more  careful  consideration  than  I  can give  it 
here.  
 






In  order  to  give  this  conclusion  a  bit more  bite,  Bernecker  starts  out  by  trying  to 
motivate  the  claim  that  we  are  able  to  have  the  kind  of  second‐order  armchair 
knowledge denied by his  conclusion.2 However,  this motivation  consists  of  a  very 
unpersuasive defence of the KK principle (or rather, a defence of the claim that KK is 
‘not  obviously  false’  (37),  since  there’s  something  to  be  said  in  its  favour,  and 
familiar  objections  to  it  aren’t  as  decisive  as  sometimes  thought).  The  only 
consideration  Bernecker  offers  on  behalf  of  KK  is  that,  taken  together  with  the 









But all  this  is  liable  to  impress as relying on a pun on  ‘implies’. Given the K‐norm, 
asserting q implies one knows q in the sense—the one operative in Moore’s original 





Moorean  assertions;  in  particular,  he  doesn’t  consider  the  better  known,  more 











place  relation  between  a  subject,  a  proposition  p,  and  a  contrast  proposition  q 
(which  can  shift  with  shifts  in  context).  This  allows  Bernecker  to  distinguish  the 
question  of  whether  one  can  have  armchair  knowledge  that  one  knows  p  rather 
                                                        
2 Bernecker also tries to make the conclusion of his argument more puzzling by suggesting that if it’s 















Anthony  Brueckner  contributes  a  critical  notice  of  Dorit  Bar‐On’s  excellent  2004 
book, which offered the most sophisticated and detailed version of an expressivist 
account of  the distinctive  security of  avowals yet produced,  and Bar‐On  is given a 
chance  to  clarify  her  position  and  respond  to  Brueckner’s  worries.  Traditional 
expressivism  goes  wrong,  according  to  Bar‐On,  in  failing  to  distinguish  various 
notions  of  expression.  The  sentence  ‘I  have  a  headache’  semantically  expresses  (s‐
expresses)  the  boring,  truth‐conditional  content  you  learned  it  does  at  your 
mother’s  knee,  even  when  avowed—this  largely  accounts  for  the  ‘neo’  in  the 
account’s name. But Bar‐On holds that in issuing that avowal, one also intentionally 
does something to directly express one’s headache: one expresses in the action sense 
(a‐expresses),  as  Bar‐on,  following  Sellars,  puts  it  (see  177  and  194  for  the 

















(such  as  that  expressed  by  ‘I  am  thinking  that  water  is  wet’)  and  generalized  to 
avowals  as  a  class.  I  didn’t  understand  Bar‐On’s  reply  to  this worry  (191‐3).  Her 
suggestion  seems  to  be  that while  Burge  recognizes  the  need  to  get  away  from  a 
model  on which knowing  that  one  is  thinking  that water  is wet  requires  bringing 
recognitional  capacities  to  bear  to determine  the  content  of  one’s  thought,  he has 
nothing to put in place of that model. Expressivism is needed to fill the gap. But, like 
Brueckner, I can’t see any such gap in Burge’s treatment of self‐verifying judgments. 
And  despite  Bar‐On’s  responses,  I  continue  to  share  Brueckner  concerns  that  her 
account of privileged self‐knowledge rests on a very radical and implausible version 
of disjunctivism (184‐5), and  that her account of  the security of avowals seems  to 
push the question back in an unsatisfactory way (180).  
 
Moreover,  Bar‐On  doesn’t  so  much  as  mention  the  biggest  problem  raised  by 
Brueckner. In Bar‐On’s book she discussed the challenge posed to neo‐expressivism 
by  ‘negative  avowals’  (such  as  ‘I  don’t want  coffee’,  ‘I’m  not  in  intense  pain’,  or  ‘I 
don’t believe that the number of stars is odd’). We might say that one is expressing 
the desire not  to have coffee in the first case, but this doesn’t readily generalize to 
the  others.  Given  central  features  of  her  account,  Bar‐On  cannot  say  that  one 
expresses the absence of the relevant desire, pain, or belief, or that in each case one 
expresses some more complex mental state (as Mark Schroeder proposes on behalf 






for  reasons/explanation’  (2004:  335).  But  this won’t  do.  As  Brueckner  points  out 
(184‐5), some negative ‘avowals’ (for instance, ‘I am not in intense pain’) seem just 
as secure, in the relevant sense, as most positive avowals. We may add that Bar‐On 
simply  isn’t  in  a  position  to  appeal  to  introspection  here.  She  argues  against 
introspectionist accounts of  the security of  (positive) avowals on  the grounds  that 
propositional  attitudes  don’t  have  any  distinctive  phenomenology  for  one  to 
introspect (2004: 103), and she also argues that, contrary to the traditional picture, 
there’s no interesting sense in which one’s mental states are transparent or salient 
to one (2004: 406‐8). Given  this, one shouldn’t have any  confidence  that  failing  to 
introspectively  locate  the  belief  that  the  number  of  stars  is  odd  signifies  that  one 









deep  well  provided  by  The  Varieties  of  Reference  in  order  to  try  to  explain  the 
connections between self‐knowledge and the first person. Bermúdez first argues for 
a  plausible  constraint  he  calls  the  symmetry  constraint,  according  to  which  any 
account of the sense of “I” must ‘preserve the possible token‐equivalence of “I” and 
other  personal  pronouns with  respect  to  same‐saying  and  relative  to  a  particular 
context’  (229),  and  draws  from  this  the  conclusion  that  we  need  to  adopt  a 
distinction  between  what  he  calls  the  token‐sense  of  “I”  and  its  type‐sense.  The 










of  the  distinctions  made  in  either  Kaplan’s  or  Perry’s  treatments  of  indexicals 
captures  the  distinction  he wants  to  draw  between  the  token‐sense  of  “I”  and  its 
type‐sense, and that Evan’s account of the sense of “I”, which appeals crucially to our 
sensitivity  to  sources  of  judgments  that  display  IEM,  is  misplaced.  Instead, 




the  sense  of  “I”,  supplementing  the  other  components  involving  IEM,  Bermúdez 
thinks it stands by itself as ‘all that we need in order to understand the token‐sense 
of “I”’ (241). And second, Bermúdez thins‐down what is required to have this ability 
in order  to make  it more plausible  that  the resulting account meets  the symmetry 






This  proposal  retains  something  of  the  spirit  of  Evans’s  account  while  being 
decidedly  more  plausible.  But  I  found  myself  sympathetic  to  the  criticisms 










dispute  this  claim as a piece of  semantic epistemology  (to borrow a useful phrase 
from Bar‐On 2004).  I  am, however,  sceptical of Sainsbury’s  claim  that  the account 
explains why some items of self‐knowledge display IEM (258‐9). First, I’m worried 
the explanation has the same defect as Neta’s, discussed above; given the range of 




while  I want  to  insist  that  these are  two distinct phenomena  that may need  to be 
handled  rather  differently  (see  the  early  chapters  of  Bar‐On  2004  for  useful 
discussion). To  take a  familiar  example, my  judgment  ‘That  is moving  really  fast!’, 
made on the basis of perception, can be IEM; we can readily make sense of the idea 
that  I’m  wrong  about  whether  the  object  I’m  demonstrating  is  moving  fast,  but 
there’s no sense to be made of the suggestion that I’m right that something is moving 
fast, but I’ve misidentified it as that. The latter sort of error hasn’t been provided for, 
to  borrow  Wittgenstein’s  well‐worn  phrase.  But  my  uses  of  that  as  a  visual 
demonstrative  aren’t  guaranteed  to  refer  to  anything.  It’s  plausible  enough  that 
Sainsbury’s account of the rule governing “I” explains why my uses of “I” to refer to 
myself seem more or less guaranteed to pick out the right object; I cannot follow the 
rule without  thinking of myself as myself  (259). But  I  think  it’s a mistake  to  think 
that  this  throws  any  light  on  the  phenomenon  of  IEM.  I  suspect  that  the  correct 





Elsewhere  in  the  volume:  Gary  Ebbs  offers  a  remarkably  complex  new  argument 
against what he calls ‘the Standard Analysis of Epistemic Possibility’; Crispin Wright 
refines  the  notion  of  transmission  failure,  and  modifies  and  qualifies  his  earlier 
diagnosis  of  the  McKinsey  paradox;  Alex  Byrne  argues  that  the  transparency 
method—suggested  by Gareth Evans,  and developed  as  an  epistemology  of  belief, 
intention, desire and so on,  in Byrne’s other writings on self‐knowledge—can also 
yield knowledge of what one is thinking; Brie Gertler does a good job of articulating 














grasped  when  one  thinks  of  oneself  as  oneself.  The  latter  work  revisits  IEM  and  guaranteed 
referential success, and distinguishes them in much the way I have in the text above. 
7 A quotation from the opening page of the paper (202), lest this come across as unduly dismissive: 
‘There  is a way for someone’s mental  life  to be—for anyone  to  think  it—only where one may think 
that life to be that way; so only where one can think of the one whose life it is that his being as he is is 
his being that way; so only where one can get in mind what is that person being that way. What, then, 










distinctive  character  of  self‐knowledge  and  first  person  thought  and  talk:  it  goes 






















9  My  thanks  to  the  members  of  the  Self‐Knowledge  pilot  project  at  the  Northern  Institute  of 
Philosophy, and to Douglas Edwards and Mark Sainsbury. 
